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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Quinn Millet,
Plaintiff and Appellant
v.

Appellate Case No. 20051106

Logan City, Ds Bridgerland Apartments,
Inc., and Cache Auto Booting Service,
Defendants and Appellees

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT

L FUENTES IS CONTROLLING PRECEDENT
The foundation of the case of Appellant ("Millet") is that the booting
ordinance of Appellee Logan City ("the City") and the relationship of Millet, the
City and the Appellees D's Bridgerland Apartments, Inc. and Cache Auto Booting
Service ("private parties") under that due-process-depriving ordinance are, in
every material respect, either analogous to or more egregious violations than the
factors in the due-process-depriving state statutes and positions of the plaintiffs,
states and private defendants in the landmark United States Supreme Court case of
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, reh 'g denied, 409 U.S.902 (1972).
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The private parties erroneously attempt to distinguish this case from
Fuentes by first asserting that four "chiefly relied on" cases, designated by asterisk
in the table of authorities of their brief, support their claim that they were not
engaged in "state action" and were not "acting under the color of authority of state
law" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. These cases all directly or indirectly relied on
Fuentes and distinguished the facts as later discussed. The City also erroneously
relies on the two United States Supreme Court cases to support its claim that it
was not a state actor. The private parties, in apparent recognition of the futility of
their arguments, in the end assert:
Furthermore, the status of Fuentes as controlling precedent has been in
question for more than 30 years, with Justice Powell's concurring opinion
that "Fuentes ... is overruled."
P. 19 of private parties' brief (citing Mitchell v. W.T.Grant Co, 416 U.S. 600 at 623
(1974)).
The false impression this statement creates when applied to this or any
other case not involving secured commercial transactions becomes apparent when
the omitted part of the quotation is supplied:
In sweeping language, Fuentes enunciated the principle that the
constitutional guarantee of procedural due process requires an adversary
hearing before an individual may be temporarily deprived of any
possessory interest in tangible personal property, however brief the
dispossession and however slight his monetary interest in the property. The
Court's decision today withdraws significantly from the full reach of that
principle and to this extent I think it fair to say that the Fuentes opinion is
overruled."
Mitchell v. W.T.Grant Co, 416 U.S. 600 at 623 (1974).
2

This minority dictum comment of Justice Powell, at most, would allow a
post-taking hearing in some cases related to basic creditor-debtor agreements not
involved in this booting case, which Justice Powell alone felt the sweeping
language of Fuentes foreclosed, but was allowed in Mitchell. The majority
correctly ruled that Fuentes expressly left the door open to the validity of the
Mitchell-type post-seizure hearings. The City's booting ordinance fails to provide
either pre- or post-seizure hearings and also violate due process in every other
essential element identified by Fuentes. The towing and booting cases in accord
with these principles have allowed an otherwise constitutional ordinance to stand
muster only if a prompt post-taking administrative hearing, in conformity with
other due process requirements, is provided. Many of the cases like Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), cited by the City also rely on Fuentes and set the
conditions justifying a post-taking versus pre-seizure hearing in otherwise
constitutional ordinances. Even if this booting ordinance had provided a due
process post booting hearing it would have failed the Fuentes and Mathews test
because the ordinance gave the initial booting decision to a private booter rather
than a required public official. The private parties ignore the fact that many of
their cited cases on all these critical issues expressly acknowledge that Fuentes is
the controlling precedent, has never been overruled, and has consistently and
repeatedly been reconfirmed. The private parties' claim that the value of Fuentes
as controlling precedent "has been in question for over 30 years" is not true.
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n. THE PRIVATE PARTIES' "CHIEF CASES" ALL SUPPORT MILLET
The four federal case authorities on which the private parties "chiefly
relied," when correctly analyzed, are expressly in accord with Fuentes. Those
cases establish that the private parties booting of Millett's car pursuant to the
unconstitutional ordinance were state actors "acting under the color of authority of
state law" within the meaning of Section 1983.
In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), the plaintiffs
Section 1983 complaint alleged that a creditor acted jointly with the state in
depriving him of his property without due process without specifying which
theory. The complaint was dismissed by both the District and Circuit courts. The
Supreme Court held that his complaint presented a valid cause of action that the
creditor acted under the color of authority of state law insofar as he challenged
constitutionality of the Virginia statute, but not insofar as he alleged only misuse
or abuse of that statute. Id, at 941-42. Though the state was not a defendant as
the City is in this case, it necessarily follows, contrary to the City's argument, that
the state was a "state actor" in adopting the unconstitutional statute that gave the
private defendants the "authority" they relied on in booting plaintiffs car. In this
respect the complaint here alleges that the private parties seized Millet's car under
the color of authority of the unconstitutional city ordinance. No claim was made
that they were violating the unconstitutional ordinance. The City's reliance on
Lugar to distance it from "state action" is even more obviously misplaced in view
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of the following quote from Lugar. 'the procedural scheme created by the statute
obviously is the product of state action." Id, at 941
The City's and private parties' "chief reliance on Flagg Bros. v. Brooks,
436 U.S. 149 (1978) can be disposed of from excerpts from the extensive analysis
of Flagg provided in Lugar. In both cases the Court determined the application of
"state action" and "color of authority of state law" in the limited context of prejudgment liens and sales under landlord liens. The ruling was limited to cases
where elements of title-lien interests existed in the seizing-selling party prior to
seizure-sale. No elements of pre-seizure lien or title are present in the bootingtowing cases. In Lugar, the Supreme analyzed Flagg and provided a
comprehensive framework for analysis of state action and color of law in the many
varied circumstances to which those terms are applied as follows:
The response of the Court, however, focused not on the terms of the statute
but on the character of the defendant to the § 1983 suit: Action by a private
party pursuant to this statute, without something more, was not sufficient to
justify a characterization of that party as a "state actor." The Court
suggested that "something more" which would convert the private party
into a state actor might vary with the circumstances of the case. This was
simply a recognition that the Court has articulated a number of different
factors or tests in different contexts: e,g, the "public function" test; the
"state compulsion" test; the "nexus" test; and, in the case of prejudgment
attachments, a " joint action test."21 Whether these different tests are
actually different in operation or simply different ways of characterizing the
necessarily fact-bound inquiry that confronts the Court, in such a situation,
need not be resolved here.
21
The holding today, as the above analysis makes clear, is limited
to the particular context of prejudgment attachment.
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 938-39.
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As detailed in Millet's brief, he relies in part on the close "nexus" test,
supported by the "Booter's letter" that the booting occurred under the color of
authority of the Booting Ordinance. See Exhibit C to Affidavit of Quinn Millet,
R. 154-156, Addendum to Brief of Appellant, tab 2. Millet couples reliance on the
nexus test with the "public function" factor, as well as other factors included in his
brief. The private parties' contend that the issue under the nexus / public function
factors is whether "the enforcement of parking restrictions on private property is a
function that has been 'exclusively reserved for the states.'" Private parties' brief,
Pp. 11-12. The critical state function operative here is not general private property
parking enforcement but rather the ordinance-delegated power to private profit
seekers to summarily seize vehicles where the authorizing ordinance also makes
resistance a crime. This is an exclusive government function.
The other two cases that these private parties chiefly rely on also strongly
support Millet's claims to their "color of authority." In Gallagher v. Neil Young
Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442 (10th Cir. 1995), the plaintiffs failed claim to
"state action / under color of law" in a concert-entry pat-down search was not
founded on the adoption of an unconstitutional law or regulation relied on by the
private actors, as in this case and in Lugar. It was rather based on claimed
participation of state officials in the individual searches, an entirely distinct
circumstance than present in this case and in Lugar. Private action in reliance on
an unconstitutional statute-ordinance is the valid nexus to private actor liability in
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this case and in Lugar, bolstered by government function. Lugar is the basis
Gallagher uses to identify and analyze the "several principles underlying the
constitutional distinction between governmental action and private conduct" as
quoted above.
The last of the private parties' "chief cases" is Hinman v. Lincoln Towing
Service Inc., Ill F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1985), which also strongly supports Millet's
case in general and on two additional points. In Hinman, the plaintiff never
claimed that the common-law towing of her carfromprivate property was done
under the color of authority of state law. On this point Hinman is illustrative but
does not apply to Millet's claim to state action based not on common-law booting,
but rather on booting pursuant to and expressly under the authority of the
expansive due-process-violating city ordinance. Lugar and the hooter's letter
strongly support this distinction.
Hinman's failed claim that the tower (relocater) acted under the "color of
state law" hinged on a claim that a state-wide statute giving a common-law tower
a lien-holder property interest in a towed car to secure the payment of a towing fee
deprived her of a due process pre-tow or prompt hearing on the validity of the
towing. The court properly held that the ordering of property rights in the form of
granting liens on property was strictly within the power of the state legislature and
not restricted by due process.
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No Utah State legislative act nor this City booting ordinance purport to give
a private landlord (or other property owner) or its private booter a lien or any other
property interest in a booted car to secure payment of a booting fee. If, arguendo, a
lien interest were to be created by the state in behalf of common-law booters to
collect a booting fee it would necessarily, under equal protection have to be by
state-wide statute and not discriminate against common law booters in Utah
outside Logan City. In this sense the ordinance might be viewed as creating an
"illegal lien" under state law. In this regard the deputy County Attorney opined in
the first council meeting that booting, as distinguished from towing, was "an
illegal lien under state law". According to the minutes, he did not distinguish
between common law booting and booting under the proposed expansive
ordinance. As alludes to due process, however, he characterized booting as
"unfair." Addendum, tab 1, exhibit B, ("Minutes"), p.l. In Hinman the state left
the "standard setting" for towing to the common law where it necessarily must be.
Logan City materially altered and expanded the common-law standards for
booting by "setting standards for booting" in the ordinance. In those same minutes
a council person did distinguish between prior common law booting and booting
under the proposed ordinance when she stated "I don't like this kind of tool being
used on behalf of the city" just before the "illegal lien" comment. Minutes, p. 1.
In spite of repeated additional warnings that there might be legal-constitutional
problems with the proposed ordinance threaded through the minutes covering over

8

fifteen months and nine council meetings considering booting, no one asked for,
volunteered or provided any legal opinions addressing constitutional or other
legality issues. The only chance the booting ordinance had of becoming legal and
constitutional was by pure chance, not by due diligence of a city attorney.
Contrary to the private parties' claim that their "chief reliance" cases
support their arguments, in fact they strongly support Millet's claim that they were
state actors acting under the color of authority of the unconstitutional ordinance.
Also, those cases support and sustain the Supreme Court's landmark Fuentes case
and expose the falsity of the claim that "the status of Fuentes as controlling
precedent has been in question for more than 30 years". The Supreme court in
Lugar and Flagg fully rely, elaborate and expand on Fuentes as controlling
precedent and never "question" any part of it. The Circuit Courts in Gallagher
and Hinman rely on Lugar and Flagg and never question their reliance on
Fuentes. Every reported state and federal case where due process in towingbooting statutes-ordinances is at issue cite and do not question Fuentes as the
controlling precedent. These cases likewise defeat the City's claim that the
adoption of the due process denying booting ordinance was not direct "state
action".
III. NEW YORK LAW SUPPORTS MILLET'S CASE
At the end of private parties' argument on Hinman at page 16 of their brief
they state: "See also Forest Hills Gardens Corp v. Baroth. 555 N.Y.S.2d 1000

9

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990 ) (holding that owner of private streets had legal right to
immobilize unauthorized parked vehicles through the application of a boot and
charge a redemption fee)." They claim this case is additional support for their
erroneous view ofHinman. Baroth* s statement of New York "common law"
versus expansive due process violating booting ordinances strongly supports
Millet's claims. As with the towing in Hinman, the booting in Baroth was done
strictly under the authority of the common law. Baroth at 1003-1004). It is well
settled New York law that no due process towing or booting can be done pursuant
to "permissive" ordinances unless the ordinance provides full due process
including an official booting decision-maker, a post-seizure administrative hearing
and other due process requirements. These and other due process elements are
absent in the City's booting ordinance. This New York rule applies to ordinanceauthorized booting on both private and public property. The 1965 New York case
of Fieldston Property Owners' Ass'n v. City of New York, 213 N.E.2d 436, 16
N.Y.2d 267 (1965) clearly limits the extent to which an ordinance may effect the
exercise of a common law right to tow-boot without violating due process.
. . . since the City acknowledges that its parking regulations are
'prohibitive' rather than 'permissive', we are not called upon to decide
whether, under the Federal and State Constitutions, it may sanction parking
on these privately owned streets over the plaintiffs objections.
Id, at 268. It is clear under New York case law that an ordinance that goes beyond
"prohibiting" and enters into "permitting" booting on private property (or public
property), as the City's expansive ordinance does, violates due process unless full
10

due process is provided in the ordinance. Millet's brief details the numerous
"permissive" elements in this booting ordinance as that term is used in Fieldston.
Others are treated later. The reported Rochester City Court case of Haefner v.
Apcoa Parking, 500 N.Y.2d 605; 130 Misc. 2d 203 (1986) is the only reported
New York case challenging the constitutionality of local New York towingbooting ordinances and rounds out relevant New York booting-towing law.
Haefner, in strong terms, finds that the city ordinance and county regulation of
towing violate due process. It analyzes and applies Fuentes to facts analogous to
this booting ordinance and lumps towing and booting together. It lays much of the
blame to the failure of the city and county attorneys to review these pre-Fuentes
laws and make them conform to Fuentes. As noted above in this case, as the
Council minutes establish, prior to adoption of this post-Fuentes ordinance there
was no review of extant legal or constitutional requirements by the City Attorney's
office, though many questions were raised that should have triggered such a
review.
IV. ABDICATION OF POLICE POWER EXCEEDS FUENTES
The Appellants argue that Fuentes is distinguishable regarding ordinance
denial of due process and "color of state law" because under the unconstitutional
replevin statutes, state officers ministerially issued and executed writs of replevin
initiated solely by the creditors without any intervening judicial review. The
private parties repeatedly argue that because public officials do not participate in
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individual bootings under the ordinance, Fuentes does not apply. The fact that
under this unconstitutional booting ordinance the police power decision to seize
the vehicle is delegated directly to the private booter without any pretense of
official action (ministerial or judicial), makes this ordinance a much more
aggravated case of total abdication of police power than in Fuentes. See Fuentes,
407 U.S. at 91-93.
V. "NEXUS" TO ORDINANCE APPLIES, NOT "JOINT ACTION"
Both the City and private parties repeatedly try to separate their actions from
each other in terms of "state action" and "color of state law" by citing cases where
"joint action" of officials and private parties is the claimed basis for private parties
"acting under the authority" of state law as defined by Lugar and applied in
Gallagher, and in which it was concluded there was no "joint action." The
operative "circumstance" in this case is most clearly rooted in the Lugar "nexus"
and "state function" factors and not "joint action." The booter was admittedly
acting under the authority of the unconstitutional booting ordinance in booting
Millet. It was the adoption this ordinance and not joint action of City officials in
the bootings that was the direct "state action" of the City. The "state function"
factor also bolsters this case as do the other factors detailed in Millet's brief.
Lugar found the same allegations of "nexus" to an unconstitutional statute
sufficient in holding the private parties. Though the state was not a party to
Lugar, the court left no doubt that its adoption of the unconstitutional booting
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procedural ordinance was direct state action: "[T]he procedural scheme created by
the statute obviously is the product of state action." Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941.
VI- BOND REVERSAL SUPPORTS MILLET
After claiming Fuentes is questionable, the private parties correctly point
out that Millet's Brief quotes from and relies on the decision and dicta in a federal
district court case that the case was reversed on appeal in Bond v. Danzer, 494
F.2d 302 (2nd Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 837 (1974). The private parties' Brief at
19, 20. Their conclusion that "Millet's reliance on this case, as overruled,
supports the Trial Court's dismissal" is untrue. The opinion on appeal lends
further support to Millet. The District Court found "state action" in the adoption
of an unconstitutional state statute. Most of the Circuit Court's reversal was
dedicated to finding that the state statute was constitutional. The decision
continued on to explain why other later rationalizations of plaintiff for "state
action" were not present under the facts of that case. That reversal came eight
years before Lugar, which also concluded that an unconstitutional statute is
"obviously" state action as discussed above.
VIL THE TWO CHICAGO CASES ARE IRRELEVANT
The private parties' final point regarding the state actors / color of law issue
is in a paragraph that on its face makes no claim to resolving that issue or any
other issue in this case. The private parties' Brief p. 18. The first case they cite is
Saukstelis v. Chicago, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15298 (N.D.I11. 1989), also 1990
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WL 147611. In paraphrasing the holding, they omit the critical aspect of the case
that the injunction sought was preliminary, which posture of the case negates any
relevance to the case at bar. They fare no better with the citation of Elliott v.
Chicago, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8609 (N.D.I11. 1989), alsol989 WL 146711. The only
bearing this case could have on Logan's booting ordinance would be regarding the
part that authorizes police-ordered booting on public streets. That aspect has been
specifically exempted from this complaint.
VIII. MILLET'S RIGHTS IMPAIRED BY THE ORDINANCE
At the end of the private parties' Brief (page 20) they argue that Millet's
rights and remedies are not diminished by the ordinance. The explanations they
give, when analyzed, show that Millet's constitutional right to due process is
denied in the various contexts in which they make their arguments. On the one
hand they deny that the ordinance makes no significant changes in common-law
booting. In addition to the specifics in Millet's Brief, the private parties here focus
on the fact that the ordinance creates a new specific Class B misdemeanor.
Addendum, tab 1, Exhibit A ("Ordinance"), p.3. Contrary to their claims in
general and their specific claim that the Ordinance only restates the common law
of booting, this section is entitled: "Regulation of impounding and booting
practices." Ordinance, p. 1. It provides multiple major changes in the common
law, only some of which were focused on in Millet's short Brief. Ordinance, Pp.
1-3. This ordinance-created impounding and booting crime is first raised in the
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private parties' Brief. Contrary to their argument that only landlords and hooters
are subject to the crime, and not the booted like Millet and others effected, the
ordinance makes it clear that "Violation of any provision of this section (by
anyone) is a Class B Misdemeanor." Under the common law the right to boot is
exclusively vested in person who has been "specially injured" by the parking
obstruction. In the landlord-tenant context as distinguished from commercial and
customer parking, it is the tenant who has been rented a parking stall and not the
landlord who suffers the special injury. See 39 AmJur2d, Highways, Streets, and
Bridges, §§ 349, 353, 358, and 369. Here are some examples of how this special
booting crime alone operates to profoundly change the common law of booting.
Unintentional violations of common-law booting or interference with it are civil,
not criminal matters. Under the common law, tenants with an assigned parking
stall and landlords with less than 4 parking spaces could boot violators either
personally or through a licensed or an unlicensed booter. Such tenants, landlords,
and licensed or unlicensed booters are not only deprived of their common law
booting rights but also become subject to prosecution for the special ordinance
booting crime. However, common-law towing rights remain untouched by the
ordinance. Commercial lot customer parking owners who had the right to directly
boot or hire non-licensed booters are guilty of the crime if they exercise their
common law right in this manner. On the other hand, landlords who have not
personally suffered the "special injury" required for common law booting, are
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permitted to initiate booting, not themselves, but only through specially licensed
booters. The booted like Millett are subject to prosecution for the crime if they
tamper with or remove the boot, even under circumstances covered in his Brief,
where under the common law and criminal statutes, the booter would have been
guilty of theft and extortion. The effect of this special booting crime clearly
illustrates the permissive and common-law altering nature of the ordinance. If
landlords and booters seize within the standards and rules provided in the
ordinance they will not be guilty of the crime even when, by so booting, it would
be a violation of their common law right. On the other hand when anyone,
including the booted, and others who suffer "special injuries" boot and would be
entitled to boot under the common law, exercise their common law rights, in
violation of the booting ordinance, they are guilty of the special ordinance-created
booting crime.
The statement that Millet's right to "seek redress, damages, or whatever
other solutions he may choose through small claims court or other courts available
to him" somehow satisfies procedural due process is absurd. Private parties'
Brief, p. 20. One of the critical elements required in ordinances effecting a
deprivation of a right is that the ordinance itself provides a due process hearing.
The notion that this due process hearing requirement is satisfied by a victim's right
to pay the filing and service fees, initiate and prosecute a regular court case
contradicts the express or implied holdings in all the cases cited in all the briefs
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related to due process hearing requirements. Put in simple terms, if when Millet or
others get a police issue parking violation citation, the ordinance provides that
they may contest it in a due process hearing without initiating a separate court case
and, paying fees that would far exceed the extorted $50.00 booting fee. Because
the primary group of targeted victims were college students as evidenced by the
Council minutes, this so called "remedy" is a useless sham. In this way the
ordinance promotes extortion without any practical remedy for the targeted victim
group. To suggest that a victim of booting has a due process hearing available in
Court is like telling the owner of a garnished account that their right to sue the
creditor for wrongful garnishment satisfies the due process requirement of
providing a post-deprivation hearing.
CONCLUSION
Appellees have not provided this Court with any valid reason to uphold the
trial court's dismissal of the complaint. This Court should reverse and remand the
case for trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED June 27, 2006.

$u
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff and Appellant
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